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BENEVOLENT BLOOD MONEY:
TERRORIST EXPLOITATION OF ZAKAT AND

ITS COMPLICATIONS IN THE WAR ON
TERRORt
"Righteousness is not merely that you turn your faces to the
East and the West, but righteous is he who believeth in Allah and
the Last Day and the angels and the Scripture and the Prophets;
and gives his wealth, for love of Him, to kinsfolk and to orphan
and the needy and the wayfarer and to those who ask, and to set
slaves free; and says Salah and gives Zakat; and those who keep
their treaty when they make one, and the patient in tribulationand
adversity and time of stress. Such are they who are sincere, Such
are the God-fearing."'
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Zakat, meaning "purify," is the Islamic concept of alms or
charity.' The obligatory nature of Zakat is firmly established in
the Qur'an3 and the Hadith.4 Zakat stands as an obligation upon
Muslims to pay two and one-half percent of their wealth if and
when it exceeds a minimum level, or nisab.5 To link this
devotional pillar of Islam to ties of terrorism and bloodshed
creates a conundrum of misplaced rights and confusion. Unlike
the American notion of separating church and state, Muslims
obligated to perform Zakat make no distinction as to how
(15th ed. 2007).
The Qur'an mentions Zakat eighty-two times to emphasize its importance. See
Zakat Foundation of America, Zakat Center, http://www.thezakat.org/zakat-inislam.aspx (last visited Aug. 29, 2008).
4 See ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (15th ed. 2007). Hadith, Arabic for 'news' or
'story' serves as a record of "the spoken traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad,
which are revered and received in Islam as a major source of religious law and moral
guidance," second only to the authority of the Qur'an or scripture of Islam. Hadith also
emphasizes Sadaqah, or voluntary almsgiving, which, like Zakat, is intended for the
needy. Id.
5 Neil MacFarquhar, Fears of Inquiry Dampen Giving by U.S. Muslims, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at Al.
2 See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
3
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charitable donations are to be employed. 6 This generous, unexacting benevolence opens its doors to deception and
criminalization, two practices one would hope would never be
connected to charity.
This Comment seeks to unravel this complex facet in the "War
on Terror." Part one provides a brief background on terrorist
funding including its relevance to the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks against the United States ("9/11"). Part two
explores the reasons why terrorists choose this stealth-like avenue
to fund their activities. Recognizing that this type of funding, if
not halted, could cripple the War on Terror and fund another 9/11,
the U.S. government has implemented several legislative acts with
the goal of eradicating this financier of terrorism. Part three
explains these acts, and how many of these measures have been
accompanied by the deprivation of civil liberties and due process
considerations. Part IV examines four cases demonstrating the
United States' process to label these charitable entities as
"designated terrorist organizations." 7 These cases query whether
the U.S. government has taken legislation too far or whether its
actions are necessary to cut terrorism funding at its roots and
prevent another devastating attack on the United States. One must
evaluate the effectiveness of the post-9/11 anti-terrorist legislation
to determine whether the lack of a subsequent attack can be
attributed to the legislation or to other factors. The pride of
America rests on the former. With this realization, should the
American population be ready to forego civil rights for the good of
the nation? The final sections of this Comment seek to evaluate
this inquiry, as well as delve into the effects of legislation on
Muslim society within the United States. These final sections will
examine what the rest of the world is doing to assist the U.S.
government in eradicating this form of terrorist financing.
This Comment does not stand as an attack, seeking to silently
display ill will towards the Patriot Act and its provisions. Rather,
its purpose is to bring forth issues that many citizens of this nation
have become so enamored with since 9/11, and to provide a new
6 See J. MILLARD BuRR

&

ROBERT 0. COLLINS, ALMS FOR JIHAD: CHARITY AND

12-13 (2006).
See U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Spokesman, Fact Sheet: Secretary of State
Designates Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO's) (Oct. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/10/frI O0501 .html.
TERRORISM IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD
7
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and thought-provoking perspective. This Comment is written with
the opinion that government actions taken after 9/11 were
necessary for national security purposes, and in that sense, have
had a positive impact. However, these security measures have not
come without sacrifice. This Comment identifies a subset of the
sacrifices that have been made in the name of national security,
but with the recognition that with these costs come benefits. We
must be cognizant that democracy flourishes when a nation's
citizenry is heard. At the same time, we must be aware that the
government must step forward to reconcile the broad gap that
exists between necessary actions for national security and the
unjust deficit of civil rights. This Comment seeks to encourage
thoughtful analysis and insightful debate on the current tug-of-war
between national security and civil rights present in the War on
Terror.
I. Background on Terrorist Funding
A. 9/11 and the FinancialWar on Terror
The United States' current War on Terror differs from
twentieth century physical engagements between militarized
nations aggressively fighting for territory and political influence!
The new enemies are elusive, fearless, and strike using stealth-like
methods. These novel, yet radical fighters utilize fear and terror to
spawn social and political agendas.9 Plagued by such extreme
enemies, the United States stands no chance fighting the war using
traditional combative methods. Finances and the risk of military
casualties stand as barriers to extricating the forces that use
religion and pride as the basis for implicating terror.
Terrorists are funding their objectives through charitable
sources that undeniably involve religious rights.1" The U.S.
government passed legislation after 9/11 in response to the
terrorist threat within our nation." Only recently has the U.S.
government received information implicating the importance of
charity and Zakat in funding al-Qaeda and other terrorist
8 See Erich Ferrari, Deep Freeze: Islamic Charities and The Financial War on
Terror, 7 SCHOLAR 205, 207 (2005).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 206.
11 id. at 213.
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regimes. 12 Even though the U.S. government has become aware of
financial support for certain terrorist regimes through charitable
networks, this form of fundraising, operating under the pretense of
humanitarianism and religion, is difficult for the U.S. government
to identify and destroy.13
B. TerroristFunding- More than Bin Laden
Al-Qaeda expended a mere $400,000 to $500,000 to carry out
the devastating attacks on the United States on September 11,
2001.14 Evidence indicates that the nineteen hijackers collectively
received a monetary reward of $300,000 from al-Qaeda through
wire transfers, physical transportation of cash, and use of debit or
credit cards to access funds from foreign financial institutions."5
According to plot leader Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the Hamburg
cell members1 6 each received $5,000 to pay for their return from
Afghanistan to Germany in late 1999 or early 2000."7 Once the
non-pilot hijackers received their training, each received $10,000
to fund travel to the United States. s The hijackers' primary
expenditures included flight school, living expenses, and travel.
All hijackers utilized the U.S. banking regime to store their funds
and facilitate transactions.19 The plotters moved, stored, and spent
their money in the most ordinary ways, making detection of
criminal behavior difficult while easily bypassing the detection
mechanisms in place prior to 9/11 2o
In addition to the rather modest funds needed to conduct
colossal attacks such as 9/11, al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations must locate finances to fund their overall
12

Id. at 206.

13 Id. at 207.
14 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE

9/11 COMMISSION

REPORT

169 (W.W. Norton & Company 2004) [hereinafter

THE 9/11

COMMISSION REPORT].

Id. at 172.
The Hamburg cell members consisted of the four German jihadists, Mohamed
Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah, all of whom played a
significant role in the 9/11 attacks. See id. at 160-63.
17 See id. at 172.
18 See id. at 169-70.
15

16

19 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14.
20 Id.
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infrastructure.21 Funding for terrorist training camps, travel
expenses, payment of operatives, weapons, technologies, and
housing is allegedly funded by a combination of Osama bin
Laden's purported inheritance, individual contributions, and, as is
the focus of this Comment, charitable contributions from various
benevolent organizations.22 Prior evidence shows al-Qaeda had
funding of approximately $30 million per year by diversions of
money from Islamic charities and other financial facilitators
gathering money from individual generous donors.23 Individual
donors may have known the ultimate destination of their
donations; others may have failed to discover the truth, believing
their charitable donations would go to benevolent causes.24

21 See id. at 169-70. In November 2008, over 170 individuals - both foreign and
domestic - were attacked and killed in downtown Mumbai, India. The Mumbai attacks
displayed a high level of planning and sophistication as the terrorists, intent on targeting
Americans, British, Israelis, and Indians, used small boats to arrive by sea from the
Pakistani megacity port of Karachi. Eight of the attacks occurred in South Mumbai, the
longest and most deadly being at the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower Hotel. Nearly sixty
hours and 170 deaths later, the attacks ceased, leaving the Indian population baffled and
angry. See Bruce Riedel, Terrorism in India and Global Jihad, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION,
Nov. 30, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2008/1130india_
terrorism riedel.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). The terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT) has claimed responsibility for the Mumbai attacks. Ajmal Amir Kasab, the only
Mumbai terrorist captured by Indian police, admitted his ten-man team trained for the
attacks in Lashkar camps within Pakistan with the support of the Inter-Service
Intelligence Agency and launched their attack from Pakistan. The Indian government
insists that Pakistan had its hand in the funding of this terrorist attack, or in turn, turned
its cheek to the terrorist training within their nation. This raises the query of how state
funding outside the realm of charity, or individual contributions, can be stopped. See
Bill Roggio, Lashkar-e-TaibaOperatives Directly Linked to Mumbai, THE LONG WAR
JOURNAL, Dec. 31, 2008, http://www.longwarjoural.org/archives/2008/12/lashkaretaiba
operati .php (last visited Jan. 20, 2009); see also Somini Sengupta, India, Giving
Pakistan Dossier on Mumbai Siege, Seeks Extradition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6. 2009, at A6.
Jamaa-ud-Dawa, a Pakistani-based charity, is accused of being a public front for LeT
militants. The United States accused the charity of recruiting and funding for LeT, who
in turn are attempting to reverse the U.S. strategy of improving Indian-Pakistani
relations. See Anthony Loyd, The "Charity" that Plotted the Mumbai Attacks, THE
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/to/commentcolumnists/guest_
contributors/article5303725.ece (last visited Jan. 20, 2009) (stating that Pakistan's
commitment to the War on Terror is being questioned, since Pakistan is allowing such
"charity" based funding for terrorism to occur within their borders.).
22 Id. at 170.
23 See id.
24

Id.
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Currently, al-Qaeda continues to take advantage of Islam's call
for Zakat. 25 By mixing religious beliefs with financial purposes,
al-Qaeda twists legal almsgiving, which is conceived as a way for
purification by the Prophet, into a financial apparatus used to fund
terrorism. 26 In Saudi Arabia alone, al-Qaeda has illegally received
between $300 million and $500 million over the last ten years
from wealthy businessmen and bankers representing about twenty
percent of Saudi gross national product. 27 This transfer of money
has occurred through a web of charities and companies acting as
fronts with the notable use of Islamic banking institutions.28
Al-Qaeda takes two approaches to using charities for
fundraising. 29 The first is to rely on al-Qaeda sympathizers in
foreign branch offices of large, international charities. 30 Here,
employees secretly siphon money from charitable funds to alQaeda. 31 Al-Qaeda also collects money through charity by
convincing entire charitable organizations to willingly participate
in funneling money to al-Qaeda.32 An article appearing shortly
after 9/11 quoted a Pakistani "cleric" who claimed that al-Qaeda
had "hundreds of well-to-do people almost everywhere in the
world" eager to financially contribute to the cause.33 Many of
these well-to-do individuals utilize Islamic charities to quench this
desire to support al-Qaeda. Evidence shows that al-Qaeda has also
collected money from employees of corrupt charities. 34 Although
terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda seem to have mechanisms
abroad to retain charitable contributions to support their activities,
questions still arise as to why terrorists seem to focus on
benevolence.
25 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14.

26 See Jean-Charles Brisard, Terrorism Financing: Roots and Trends of Saudi
Terrorism Financing, A Report Prepared for the President of the Security Council,
United Nations (Dec. 19, 2002), availableat http://www.nationalreview.com/document/
document-un 122002.pdf.
27 Id. at 11.
28 Id. at 21.
29 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 170.
30 Id. at 170.
31 Id. at 170.

32 Id. at 170-71.
33 See BURR, supranote 6, at 8.
34 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 170.
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II. Terrorist Funding
A. Why TerroristsExploit Benevolence
Islamic charities seek to provide basic goods and services to
communities, both local and abroad, in a manner consistent with
the values and teachings of Islam.35 The U.S. government is not
easily able to discern whether Islamic charities that collect funds
for a particular humanitarian cause are actually being utilized for
that purpose, or, as many government agents fear, for monetary
support of terrorism.36 Described as "reverse money laundering,"
charity-based financing of terrorism is concerned with using legal
assets for an illegal activity, namely terrorist attacks.37 Charitable
organizations are also attractive targets for terrorist entities
because of the reluctance of many outside nations to rigorously
monitor and scrutinize their activities.38 Especially prevalent in
Muslim nations, authorities are faced with discerning between
legitimate charities and those that are unknowingly or knowingly
being used to divert funds to terrorists, who in turn may be
fighting for an illegitimate cause.39 Since Zakat and Sadaqah are
viewed as religious responsibilities, governments are reluctant to
scrutinize their usage.4"
For example, both companies and
individuals in Saudi Arabia have a legal and religious obligation to
pay Zakat.41 Their contribution is calculated on earnings, profits,
capital and all other property and monetary acquisitions.42 Saudi

35 See Robert Looney, The Mirage of Terrorist Financing: The Case of Islamic
5
STRATEGIC
INSIGHTS
2
(2006),
available
at

Charities,

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/Mar/looneyMar06.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
36 Id.

37 See id. (explaining money laundering, which is concerned with laundering
assets of illegal origin and bringing them back into legal economic circulation).
38 Id.

39 See id.
40 Id. (defining "sadaqah" as supporting charitable works through voluntary
contributions).
41 See John D.G. Waszak, The Obstacles to Suppressing Radical Islamic Terrorist
Financing, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 673, 697 (2004). See also Saudi Arabia Basic

Law (1992), ch.l art. 21 ("Alms tax is to be levied and paid to legitimate recipients.").
Saudi Arabia's "Basic Law" states that the Holy Qur'an and the Sunna of His Prophet are
Saudi Arabia's constitution. Id.
42 See Waszak, supra note 41, at 698.
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banks pay Zakat on financial transaction fees. 43 These voluntary
transactions and contributions leave no paper trail, providing little
opportunity for government oversight. 44 Zakat contributed by
companies is controlled by the Department of Zakat and Income of
the Saudi Ministry of Finance and National Economy, which has
developed guidelines on who shall pay Zakat and how these funds
shall be received. 45 The government also has stern guidelines on
how to transfer these funds to charities.46
The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) is another territory that
serves as a breeding ground for terrorist fundraising, placing a
hardship on the United States' ability to strengthen regulation.
The U.A.E breeds various "free trade zones" giving foreigners
unfettered access and control over commercial activities. 47 These
commercial activities may include legitimate goods or illegal
merchandise. 48 Additionally, over eighty hawala operators operate
in the U.A.E. 49 A hawala is an informal fund transfer system, used
by migrants to send money back to their home country.5" Since
this money transferring system lacks formal record keeping, it can
serve as a delivery system for terrorist financing."
The
transferring of money goes through money changers (hawaladars)
receiving cash in one nation with no questions asked.52
Correspondent hawaladars in another country dispense an identical
amount to a recipient or, less often, to a bank account.53 Hundi,
which act as negotiable promissory notes, are emailed between

43

Id.

44 "When a man gives Zakah to the poor he cannot stipulate the conditions on how

the poor man should spend the money. If he spends on some evil acts is not the
responsibility of the donor." Prince Salman bin Abd al-Aziz, Governor of Riyadh
Region. See BURR, supra note 6, at 26 (citing "Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz: Rejects
Charges against Saudi Charitable Societies," Ayn Al Yaqeen, Saudi Arabia (November
8, 2002)).
45 See Waszak, supra note 41.
46 Id.
Id.
Id.
49 Id. at 702 & n. 182.
50 Id. at 702-03.
51 See Waszak, supra note 41, at 702-03.
52 Id.
47

48

53 Id.
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hawaladars in differing nations. 4 The sender will provide the
recipient with code words or agreed signals like handshakes to
retrieve money. 5 Understandably, such systems have almost no
chance of being detected due to lack of paper work and the ancient
and ethnic cultural relationship based on trust.56 The hawaladars
are left to police themselves and are reluctant to disrupt the ancient
practice. 7
The United States has and will continue to encounter obstacles
when attempting to force other nations to alter their economic
surroundings under U.S. based guidelines. 8 Governments within
numerous Middle Eastern nations appear to have an interest in
preventing terrorist financing, but such efforts could cause social
upheaval and threaten to further radicalize the Middle East.5 9
Nations such as Saudi Arabia find themselves in this situation.
With lucrative oil revenues and self-survival at odds, how can a
nation risk upheaval from its citizens on the basis of strictly
adhering to U.S.-based policies that will place a strong hold on
Muslim charities and benevolent individuals? This political reality
causes the Saudi Arabian government to take a nearly bi-polar
position: it is forced to appear to be confronting terrorism and
terrorist financing by writing laws, but must turn its cheek if these
laws are broken in order to appease radical clerics, its citizenry,
and al-Qaeda.6 ° The politics seen in Saudi Arabia are echoed
throughout the entire Middle East, as well as in other Muslim
nations throughout the world. The thin line between regulating
religion and avoiding social upheaval forces the government to
loosen their grasp on those exploiting Zakat for terror.

54 Id. at 702.
55 Id.
56

Id. at 703.

See Waszak, supra note 41, at 703.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title I, § 106, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
59 See Waszak, supra note 41, at 705.
60 Id. at 706.
57
58
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B. Exploiting Benevolence in the United States
Charities have a substantial impact on the U.S. economy.6
With nearly $2 trillion in assets stemming from some 800,000
charities, of which 350,000 are religiously affiliated, one can
foresee the concerns that would arise if corruption were to
infiltrate American charitable organizations.6 2 Former Secretary
of Treasury Paul O'Neill has noted that the abuse of charities
corrupts the spirit of charitable giving and betrays the trust and
goodwill of donors.6 3 This betrayal allows terrorists to obtain
funds in the form of charity while profiting from tax benefits, the
ability to divert funds overseas, and the religious sympathies of
donors.'
Under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 501(c)(3), 65 for a
charitable organization to be exempt from taxes it must operate so
that "none of the earnings of' the organization... inure to any
private shareholder or individual., 66 The organization must also
refrain from attempting to influence legislation as a substantial
part of its activities. 67 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
defined the term charitable to include "relief of the poor, the
distressed, or the underprivileged; advancement of religion,
advancment
of education...
and combating
community
deterioration and juvenile delinquency. ' 68
The Qur'an's
categories stating eligibility for Zakat seem to parallel the IRS's
defined terms for benevolence. The "poor, converts, wayfarers,
those in bondage or in debt ' 69 may all fall under the general terms

61 See Joel G. MacMull, Removing the Charitable Veil: An Examination of U.S.

Policy to Combat Terrorist Functioning CharitiesPost 9/11, 10 NEW. ENG. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 121, 123 (2004).
62 See id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 123-24.
65 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
66 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); see also United States Department of the
Treasury, Charities & Non-Profits: Exemption Requirements, Internal Revenue Service,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/O,,id=96099,00.html (last visited Aug. 29,

2008).
67 Id.
68 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
69 BuRR,

supra note 6, at 12.
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of charity defined under the I.R.C. section 501(c)(3). 7" The
Qur'an's other stated categories include those committed to Allah
for the spread and triumph of Islam, newcomers whose faith is
weak, and new converts to Islam "whose hearts have been
[recently] reconciled [to truth]" - all seemingly fall within the
"advancement of religion."71
Other reasons exist for a terrorist organization to operate as a
charity that are not readily apparent. Structural weaknesses in
charitable giving enable funds to be more easily diverted. As
stated previously, the existence of physical access to channel funds
overseas, especially into nations that have more relaxed financial
oversight measures, lays a foundation that allows terrorists to
subvert many existing measures to prohibit money laundering or
control overseas banking. 72 The ability to exploit the emotion and
sympathy of donors is an added reason to operate under the guise
of a charitable organization. Using benevolence also confuses the
federal government's ability to closely scrutinize charitable
activities without a perceived backlash from both charitable and
religious communities.73
III. Measures Taken by the U.S. Government to Halt the War
on Terror
A. FreezingAssets and Other Economic Sanctions Used in
the U.S. Government's FinancialWar on Terrorism
A necessary weapon in the U.S. government's war on terror,
especially in halting the financial backing of terrorism, is the use
of economic sanctions against terrorist groups, individual
terrorists, and those that sponsor terrorist activities. Discretionary
power to impose economic sanctions has increased with
heightened threats to the United States.74 Nonetheless, the power
to impose economic sanctions during war or a national emergency
70 See id.
71 Id. at 8.
72 See id.at 123.
73 See id.
74 Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of
Terrorism and itsImplications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and
Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. Rlv. 1341, 1347 (2004).
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has long resided within the office of President of the United
States"
The U.S government began imposing sanctions on enemies as
early as colonial times.76 Sanctions were utilized under the
Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA)77 that made it illegal for
U.S. nationals to engage in trade and commerce with declared
enemies of the United States78 The TWEA gave the President
broad discretionary powers in times of war, allowing him to
restrict or prohibit certain transactions deemed threatening to the
United States.79 Pursuant to section 5(b) of the TWEA, the
President had authority during times of war to regulate property
ownership "between the United States and any foreign country,
whether enemy, ally of enemy or otherwise, or between residents
of one foreign nation, by any person within the United States." 80
Although the TWEA is a powerful tool used by the President to
exercise vast power during a time of war, this power is limited
during peacetime. 8
In 1977, Congress expanded the President's statutory authority
to allow imposition of sanctions to deal with an "extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside of
the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States if the president declares a national
emergency with respect to such threat."82 The International
Emergency and Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) originally limited
the President's power to actions strictly relating to national
emergency.83 However, this power was further expanded by the
USA Patriot Act, which passed as a result of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks.84 IEEPA's authority now gives the President heightened
authority to confiscate property and block assets during pending
75

Id. at 1354.
1355.

76 Id. at

Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 5; see also
Crimm, supra note 74, at 1355-59.
78 TWEA 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 5(b)(1).
77

79 Id.

80 Id.
81 See id.

82 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(2003) (emphasis added).
83 See Crimm, supra note 74, at 1357.
84 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 106.
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investigations."
The new language added by the Patriot Act also "broadens the
government's authority to investigate, regulate, and freeze any
property . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 86

Section 1702(c) allows the President to act when the United States
is engaged in unconventional war.87 This section also specifically
grants the President the authority to confiscate and dispose of any
property or interest ... within the jurisdiction of the United States

and that belongs to any foreign individual, foreign entity, or
foreign country determined to have "planned, authorized, aided or
engaged" in the 9/11 attacks or any other attack against the United
States. Under 3 U.S.C. § 301, the President can entrust authority
stemming from 5 U.S.C. § 1702 to "the head of any department or
agency in the executive branch . . . [and] to perform without

approval, ratification, or other action by the President... any
function which is vested in the President by law .

-.88

The

ability to delegate power enabled President William Jefferson
Clinton to issue Executive Order 12,947 (E.O. 12,947).89 Pursuant
to this Order, President Clinton blocked all transfers and interests
in property of twelve designated foreign terrorist organizations.9"
These organizations, both foreign and domestic, designated under
E.O. 12,947, were labeled Specially Designated Terrorists
Entities. 9' The E.O. also prohibits U.S. citizens, resident aliens,
and domestic entities from engaging in any transaction with any
designated organization or individual.92 President Clinton deemed
that terrorists disrupting the Middle East peace process were an
unusual and extraordinary threat to national security and the
economy of the United States.93 E.O. 12,947 delegated to the
Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney General authority granted
to the President under the IEEPA to carry out any duties pursuant

85 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 106.

86 Crimm, supra note 74, at 1359.
87 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2003).
88 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); see also Crimm, supra note 74, at 1358-60.

89 Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
90 Id.
91 Crimm, supra note 74, at 1362.
92 Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
93 Id.
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to this Order.94
B. Executive Order 13,224 (2001)
On September 19, 2001, President George W. Bush declared

that the War on Terror would shift its focus to "NGOs,
nongovernmental organizations, [which] serve as fronts, as a
funding mechanism for terrorist organizations."95 In furtherance
of this statement, President Bush issued E.O. 13,224 on September
23, 2001, just thirteen days after 9/11.96 Executive Order 13,224
was filed pursuant to the authorities of the IEEPA, 9v the National
Emergencies Act, 98 section 5 of the United Nations Participation
Act of 1945, 99 and 3 U.S.C. § 301.00
Declaring a national emergency to deal with the extraordinary
and unexpected threat to national security, foreign policy, and the
economy of the United States, President Bush insisted that
sanctions would be utilized to halt monetary transactions that
support foreign terrorists.'0 ° Pursuant to E.O. 13,224, the property

94 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
95 George W. Bush, U.S. President, Remarks at a Photo Opportunity (Sept. 19,
2001), availableat http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/19/se.13.html.
96 Exec. Order. No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
97
98

See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2003).
See 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2002).

99 See 22 U.S.C. § 287 (2000).
100 See 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
101 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Jan. 23, 1995). The text of
President Bush's findings pursuant to Executive Order 13,224 states:
"I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, find that grave acts
of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including the
terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon committed on September
11, 2001, acts recognized and condemned in UNSCR 1368 of September 12, 2001, and
UNSCR 1269 of October 19, 1999, and the continuing and immediate threat of further
attacks on United States nationals or the United States constitute an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States, and in furtherance of my proclamation of September 14, 2001, Declaration of
National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks, hereby declare a national
emergency to deal with that threat. I also find that because of the pervasiveness and
expansiveness of the financial foundation of foreign terrorists, financial sanctions may be
appropriate for those foreign persons that support or otherwise associate with these
foreign terrorists. I also find that a need exists for further consultation and cooperation
with, and sharing of information by, United States and foreign financial institutions as an
additional tool to enable the United States to combat the financing of terrorism."
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of twenty-seven designated foreign persons was seized. °2 E.O.
13,224 now prohibits U.S. individuals and entities from engaging
in economic transactions, including services, for the benefit of
designated persons subject to the Order.1 3 Persons violating E.O.
13,224 are subject to criminal prosecution." 4 The E.G also
authorizes the Secretary of Treasury to freeze the assets of
additional persons who, after investigation, are determined to be
associated with terrorism.0 5 President Bush made a subtle, yet
important conclusion when he stated that "[p]rior notice... taken
10 6
pursuant to this order would render these measures ineffectual.',
As stated by the President's orders, notice is not necessary prior to
designation pursuant to E.O. 13,224.'07
Relating to charitable contributions, E.O. 13,224 is limited by
section 1702(b) of the IEEPA, which precludes the President from
regulating or prohibiting donations made with the intent to relieve
human suffering.'0 8 However, an exception exists to section
1702(b). Under the IEEPA, humanitarian donations may be
regulated if the President determines that such donations would
"seriously impair his ability to deal with" a national emergency.'0 9
The U.S. government has deemed E.O. 13,224 to be one of the
best-suited tools to disable terrorist groups and funding." 0 Soon
after President Bush implemented E.O. 13,224, the government
added multiple terrorist organizations, that were previously under
U.S. investigation, to the list of specifically designated terrorist

102 Id.; see also http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/

terror.pdf for a current list of terrorists, and groups identified under E.O. 13,224.
103 Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 2(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
104Crimm, supra note 74, at 1367.

1o5Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 2(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
106 White House Press Release, Executive Order: Blocking Property of Certain
Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq, July 17, 2007,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070717-3.html (last visited Sept.
1,2008).
107 Crimm, supra note 74, at 1368.
108 Kathryn A. Ruff, Scared to Donate: An Examination of the Effects of
Designating Muslim Charities as Terrorist Organizations on the First Amendment
Rights of Muslim Donors, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 447, 454-58 (2005); see also
50 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (2000).
109 Ruff, supra note 108, at 457.
1l1 Id. at 456.
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entities."'1 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC)
and the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) were among the
designated entities. 12 These non-Muslim designations purportedly
refute many Muslim activists' claims that the Specially Designated
Global Terrorist (SDGT) process singles out Islamic or Middle
Eastern terrorist groups.13
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)".4 maintains the
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocks Persons (SDN) list, a
comprehensive roster of several blacklists."' OFAC was formally
created in December of 1950 when President Harry Truman,
pursuant to the Korean War, declared a national emergency and
froze all Chinese and North Korean assets." 6 Now acting as a
subset of the Department of Treasury," 7 this quiet, rather
unnoticeable agency yields enormous power and influence on the
global financial markets. OFAC has the power to "administer and
enforce economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy
and national security goals against targeted foreign countries,
terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, and those engaged in
activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.""' 8 OFAC's role in regulating terrorist funding is
unmatched; it has the ability to place an entity on the SDN list and
have its assets blocked pursuant to an investigation without giving
the entity a formal terrorist designation. 119 Pursuant to an
amendment of the IEEPA, 12 the government is now able to

'"I
112

Id.
Id.

113 Id. at 457-58.
114 OFAC is the successor of the Office of Foreign Funds Control (FFC), which was
established at the advent of World War II. The FFC's initial purpose was to prevent
Nazi use of the occupied nations holdings of foreign exchange and securities and prevent
forced repatriation of funds belonging to nationals of those countries. See Dep't of The
Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked Questions and Answers,
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/answer.shtmi#2, (last visited Feb.
18, 2008).
115 Ruff, supra note 108, at 458.
116 Dep't of The Treasury, supra note 114.

117 Id.

118 Id.
119 Id.
120 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 106. (Section 106 of the USA
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investigate transactions, which may elevate any threat to national
security during a declared national emergency, as well as "block
Along with
[transactions] during pendent investigations."''
maintaining the lists encompassing all designated terrorist
organizations and individuals under the SDT and SDGT, OFAC
holds the power to freeze assets for other reasons including
narcotics trafficking and money laundering.' 2 2
The Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTATC) is
utilized within the spectrum of OFAC to assist in the identification
of foreign terrorist groups and those who support them.'23 The
FTATC's goal is to disrupt and intercept terrorist funding.'24
Working with the Department of State and the Attorney General,
the FTATC has acted pursuant to E.O 13,224 to uncover,
designate, and direct action against charitable organizations and
linked with the financing of terrorist
institutions found to be
25
groups and individuals.1
The FTATC was originally comprised of the same number of
agencies as Operation Green Quest, a multi-agency, financial
enforcement initiative that the Department of the Treasury
announced on October 25, 2001, to identify and dismantle terrorist
networks and their funding.'2 6 In November 2002, the Bush
from the
Treasury
Administration
transferred
FTATC
Department's OFAC to the CIA, housing the FTATC in the
Director of Intelligence's counterterrorism center. 127 The FTATC,
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and local law enforcement
now seek out Islamic institutions and charities operating
sophisticated schemes to and from the United States. 2 Assistant

PATRIOT Act amended the IEEPA by authorizing the President to block assets during
investigation and before designation).
121 Id.
122 Ruff, supra note 108, at 458.
123 See Fact Sheet on Terrorist Financing Executive Order (Sept. 24, 2001),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-2.html (last visited Sept.
1,2008).
124 BURR, supra note 6.
125 CRS Report For Congress, Terrorist Financing:
Current Efforts and Policy
Issues for Congress (Aug. 20, 2004), http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL32539.pdf.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 15.
128 Id.
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Secretary of Treasury Kenneth Dam addressed the issue with
Muslim charities, threatening that FTATC stood ready to act even
if it had yet to acquire all necessary evidence to determine which
charities were using funds for uncharitable purposes. Dam stated
that the current challenge "is to prevent terrorists from using
charities as a cover for supporting terrorism while ensuring that
charitable giving and charitable works continue."12' 9
This
challenge has been accelerated by language barriers and cultural
mores. 3 0 Now faced with the reality that benevolence is a facet of
terrorist funding, the United States struggles to find a balance
between the designating and freezing of blood money, and the
allegedly unconstitutional process used to reach this end.
C. Office of ForeignAssets Control DesignationProcess
The U.S. Treasury Department's terrorist designation process
has incited controversy between those in the legal field
representing Islamic charities, and government officials who
believe that the designation process is being carefully managed
and reflects post 9/11 realities.' 3 '
To instigate OFAC's
designation process, "a number of U.S. agencies, including the
Departments of Treasury, State, Justice, as well as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the intelligence community, review
open source and confidential information, including tips and leads,
about persons and entities who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism. '
A "subset of the agencies" then develop a
background file, which is reviewed to determine if there is
adequate evidence to begin the designation process.'
Deputy
heads will meet to make a recommendation to the Secretary of
Treasury after the file is forwarded to the National Security
Council. 3 4 In cooperation with the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury will then issue a
supra note 6, at 9-10.
Id. at 9.

129 BURR,
130

131 David Ottoway, Groups, U.S. Battle Over 'Global Terrorist'Label, WASH. POST,
Nov. 14, 2004, at Al.
132 U.S. Dep't of State, Office of Counterterrorism, The United States Terrorist
Assets
Designation
Process
Background
Sheet
(Feb.
28,
2002),
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/8565.htm.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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final designation and blocking order. 35 This blocking order is
implemented by OFAC.'3 6
Pursuant to E.O. 13,224 and the OFAC blocking order, no
137
notice is given to the entity prior to the freezing of its assets.
Upon issuance of the final blocking order, the entity is told that its
in
assets have been frozen. 138 The entity's name is then published
139
the Federal Register and disseminated to financial institutions.
If a blocked entity wishes to challenge its designation as an
SDGT and request removal from the list on grounds of mistaken
identity or pure error, the entity must follow OFAC's assigned
process for seeking removal. 4 ° The entity must first submit its
request in writing to OFAC, which includes the reason the entity
believes its funds were blocked in error. 14' The request for
submission will be reviewed by OFAC, with additional
information from the petitioner usually requested. 142 At no point
does the petitioner have an opportunity to review any classified
143
evidence that the "subset of agencies" compiled against it.
Removals from the SDGT list, which are not frequent, have
always been in cases in which the petitioner is able to establish
that he is no longer engaging in any activities that qualify him for
designation. 144
Entities seeking a meaningful opportunity to defend
themselves lack due process protections. 145 They are given an ex
135Id.
136

Id.

137 Exec. Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
138 See R. Colgate Selden, The Executive Protection: Freezing the FinancialAssets
of Alleged Terrorists, the Constitution, and Foreign Participation in U.S. Financial
Markets, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491,498 (2003).
139Id.

140 For more on the Terrorist Designation Process, see Fact Sheet: Background on
Terror Assets Designation Process, U.S. Dep't of State Office of Counterterrorism (Feb.
28, 2002), availableat http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2002/020228/epf4O5.htm.
14131 C.F.R. §§ 501.806-07 (2004).
142 Id.
143See Nicole Nice-Peterson, Justicefor the Designated: The Process That is Due
to Alleged U.S. Financiersof Terrorism, 93 GEO. L.J. 1387, 1390-95 (2005).
144 Id. at 1405-19.
145 See generally id. (discussing what minimum procedures are required to allow
U.S. entities accused of terrorist connections a meaningful opportunity to defend
themselves).
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parte, in-camera review. 4 6 Courts reviewing IEEPA designations
pursuant to the administrative record compiled by the Secretary of
State and OFAC have not been flexible regarding challenges to
accuracy and completeness of the administrative record.' 47 One
must remember that challenges are enabled under the IEEPA as
previously explained; however, they usually occur only after the
detrimental effects of designation and frozen funds that stand 1to
48
destruct the appellant's organization or charity have taken place.
Multiple members of the United Nations have expressed their
disagreement with the process the United States employs in the
freezing of assets. 149 It is argued that the United States should
disclose more 50of the evidence it uses to designate an entity as a
terrorist front. 1
As we delve into prior case law surrounding the struggle
between U.S. security and civil rights, the question again must be
raised whether the brawny measures taken by the U.S. government
have prevented another attack on U.S. soil, or whether the lack of
another attack post-9/1 I is attributable to other factors. Patriotic
notions disallow the latter, insisting that the former, including E.O
13,244, has halted terrorist funding, deterred terrorist sentiment,
and decreased terrorist muscle. 5 '
IV. Challenging the 'SDGT' Designation: U.S.-Based Muslim
Charities
The Bush administration's belief that terrorists "often-times
use nice-sounding, non-governmental organizations as fronts for
their activities," ensured that international and domestic charities
were on its radar.5 2
In December 2001, under the Bush
Id.
147 See Sahar Aziz, The Laws on Providing Material Support to Terrorist
Organizations: The Erosion of Constitutional Rights or A Legitimate Tool for
Preventing Terrorism?, 9 TEX. J. C. L. & C. R. 45, 65 (2003).
148 See Nice-Peterson, supra note 143, at 1395.
146

149 Id.

150 Id. at 1393-95.
151 See,
e.g.,
Country
Reports
on
Terrorism
2004,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/c-rprt-terrorism-2004-04.htm
(last visited Sept. 15, 2008) ("EO and FTO designations support U.S. efforts to curb
financing of terrorism and encourage other nations to do the same.").
152 See Nice-Peterson, supra note 143, at 1396 (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury, Progress in the War on Terrorist Financing (Sept. 11, 2003), available at
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administration, four of the largest Muslim charities within the
United States had their assets blocked and were placed on the
SDGT.'53 All of these
charities appealed their designation; none
54
of them succeeded. 1

A. Holy Land Foundation
The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF)
was the first charity to be designated as an SDGT by the Bush
Administration pursuant to E.O. 13,224.155
Described as
America's most perfectly disguised Islamic "charity," the
foundation's stated purpose was to assist "victims of [] Palestinian
upbringing. ' ' 15

HLF was

a 501(c)(3)

nonprofit charitable

organization. Opened under the moniker Occupied Land Fund,
HLF was found to have obtained funding from various individuals
closely linked to Hamas 1 57 Pursuant to President Clinton's
Executive Order on January 23, 1995, Hamas was a designated
terrorist entity.'58 Evidence against HLF existed, but no action
was taken within the United States.15 9 Israeli forces, however,
raided the HLF office in Jerusalem in 1997 and purportedly found
several documents that directly contradicted HLF's claims that
funds were collected strictly for humanitarian purposes. 60
HLF quietly continued to expand. It raised more than $5
million in 1998, $6 million in 1999, and $13 million in 2000.161
On December 4,2001, HFL was labeled as an SDGT acting on
behalf of Hamas 1 62 Pursuant to a blocking notice issued by
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js721.htm).
153 Id.

154 Id.
155Id. at 1396.
156 See BURR, supra note 6, at 271 (the Holy Land Foundation website has since
been removed, but it has been archived by the Library of Congress, available at
http://memory.loc.gov/91 i/catalog/096 l.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2008)).

157 Id. The Occupied Land Fund received its first substantial donation from Musa
Abu Marzouk who was found to be the head of the Hamas political bureau. Id.
158 Id. at 273.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64
(D.C.Cir. 2002), affd, 333 F. 3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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OFAC, all of HLF's funds, accounts, and real property were
frozen.163 The blocking notice did not contain evidence setting
forth specific IEEPA violations by HLF. 6 The same day the
blocking order was issued, government agents entered HLF offices
in Texas, Illinois, New Jersey, and California, seizing and
removing all contents. 165 No warrant was issued prior to the
raids. 166 Pursuant to the order, HLF was no longer able to involve
167
itself in transactions without specific authorization from OFAC.
HLF moved for a preliminary injunction in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia challenging the SDGT
designation and the freezing of its assets. 168 HLF argued that
OFAC's actions were in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution and arbitrarily took place in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 169 The government argued
that it had substantial evidence that millions of dollars in HLF
charitable funds were distributed to Hamas. 170 Additionally, it
moved to dismiss the due process claims, arguing that predeprivation notice and hearing are unreasonable in exigent
circumstances, and that actions were taken pursuant to OFAC's
designated review procedures. 17' The government further argued
that HLF had "ample opportunity" to contest its designation as an
SDGT. 7 2 HLF petitioned the court to admit various exhibits to
supports its defense including sworn affidavits from its CEO
Id.
164 See Nice-Peterson, supra note 143, at 1396.
165 Id.
166 See Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
163

167 Id.
168
169
170

See Nice-Peterson, supra note 143, at 1397.
Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
Id. at 70.

17' Id. at 62.
172 Nice-Peterson, supra note 143, at 1397; see also Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at
76. One can see the previously discussed tension between interests of national security
and civil liberties in this case. Under due process considerations, HLF argued that they
were unable to obtain a fair trial before their assets were frozen and their offices raided.
HLF also argued that OFAC's actions were in violation of First and Fourth Amendment
rights granted by the U.S. Constitution. See id. However, the government may have felt
that the threat in giving the court confidential information on how these charities have
been "caught" would hinder their ability to prosecute these corrupt entities and give
terrorists a way to work around the government's evidence gathering. See id.
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denying that HLF provided support to Hamas'73 and evidence that
the U.S. government had provided aid to the same Hamas174
affiliated hospitals to which HLF is alleged to have contributed.
HLF accused OFAC of avoiding and excluding evidence
submitted by HLF that was contrary to OFAC's position, in turn,
175
making the record incomplete and detrimentally inaccurate.
Unable to obtain evidence in a timely manner to refute OFAC's
allegations before it planned to redesignate HLF as an SDGT in
May 2002, the district court rejected HLF's review under the APA
and strictly applied the established rule, which limited the scope176of
review under the APA to the "[o]riginal administrative record.'
The administrative record included numerous hearsay
materials that would not ordinarily be considered under a
summary judgment proceeding, including classified material that
HLF was not allowed to review or refute. 177 No extra-record
evidence was admitted. 178 The court reasoned that since OFAC
provides designated entities post-deprivation rights to present
counter-evidence, the administrative record becomes binding as
the court's scope of review. 17'
The court reviewed OFAC's
designation of HLF as an SDGT under the arbitrary and capricious
standard. 8 ' It held that OFAC's decision met "certain minimal
standards of rationality"'' in that the administrative record
contained "ample evidence" that:
(1) HLF has had financial connections to Hamas since
its creation in 1989; (2) HLF leaders have been actively
involved in various meeting with Hamas leaders; (3)
HLF funds Hamas-controlled charitable organizations;
(4) HLF provides financial support to orphans and
173 Nice-Peterson, supra note 143, at 1398.
174 Id.

175 Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
176 Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004).
177 See Nice-Peterson, supra note 143 (citing Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 85).

The administrative record, as explained previously, did not contain any refutations on the
part of Holy Land. Id.
178 Id.
179 Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 66.
180 Id. at 74.
181 Id. at 67.
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families of Hamas martyrs and prisoners; (5) HLF's
Jerusalem office acted on behalf of Hamas; and (6) FBI
82
informants reliably reported that HLF funds Hamas.1
On due process grounds, HFL challenged OFAC's designation
pursuant to the lack of pre-designation notice or a hearing to offer
counter-evidence to enable inclusion in the administrative
record.' 83 The court found that a failure of notice and hearing
occurred; however, it determined that this failure did not amount
to a due process violation." 4
The court deemed that the
President's declaration of a national emergency under the IEEPA
constituted an extraordinary situation whereby notice and hearing
after seizure did not amount to a denial of due process.'8 5 The
reviewing court also found that the U.S. government had satisfied
all requirements: (1) the deprivation served an important
government interest, in this case combating terrorism; (2) prompt
action was necessary to prevent the transfer of assets prior to the
blocking order; and (3) government officials blocked the assets
pursuant to the IEEPA.'86
The court also dismissed HLF's
constitutional claim under the First Amendment of right to
association, deeming that the blocking order did not "[p]rohibit
membership in Hamas or endorsement of its views, and therefore
[did] not implicate HLF's associational rights."' 8 7 Further, the
court held that freedom of association had not been violated
because designation and blocking of funds promote substantial
governmental interests in combating terrorism by undermining its
financial base, and that "there is no other, narrower means of
ensuring that charitable contributions to a terrorist organization are
for a legitimate purpose."' 8 8 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court
affirmed the lower court's decision and upheld OFAC's
designation of HLF as an SDGT. 189 Pointing to national security
interests, the court upheld the government's reliance on hearsay
Id. at 69.
Id.
184 Id. at 76.
185 Holy Land, 219 F.Supp.2d at 76 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)).
186 Id. at 76-77; see also Sahar Aziz, supra note 147, at 65.
187 Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 81.
188 See id. at 81-82.
182
183

189 Id.
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throughout the record, as well as its consideration of strictly
classified evidence. 9 ° The court also determined that HLF's due
process rights were not violated because it was shown that
"notification would impinge upon security or other foreign policy
goals of the United States,"'' and that HLF obtained a written
opportunity to be heard post-deprivation when it submitted
materials to OFAC for its consideration.'
Thus, pre-seizure
notice of the blocking order was not necessary.' 9394 In 2004, HLF
was denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
B. Global Relief Foundation
Global Relief Foundation (GRF) began operating in 1992 as a
domestic non-profit organization headquartered in Illinois.' 95 In
its complaint, GRF claimed to be a charitable organization that
funds humanitarian relief programs around the world.' 96 Global
Relief Foundation characterizes itself as the largest U.S.-based
Islamic organization "with respect to the geographic scope of its
relief programs."' 97 In 2000, Global Relief reported nearly $3.7
million in charitable funding.'98 Its distribution of aid reached
China, Pakistan, Iraq, and various other nations. Although many
of its funds came from the United States, nearly ninety percent of
its donations were sent abroad.' 99
On December 14, 2001, the FBI searched the headquarters of
GRF and the home of its executive director.2 °° Materials ranging
from credit cards to computers were seized for analysis by the
FBI; on the same day, pursuant to IEEPA and E.O. 13,224, OFAC
issued a blocking notice and requirement to furnish information.20 '
190 Id.

191 HolyLand, 333 F.3d at 163.
192

Id.

193

Id.
Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev. v. Ashcrofl, 540 U.S. 1218, 124 S.Ct. 1506

194

(2004).
195 Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 785 (2002).
196
197
198

Id.
Id.
Id.

199 Id.
200 Id.
201

GlobalRelief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
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The blocking order froze all of GRF's assets until further notice.
The government's blocking order minimally acknowledged that it
"had reason to believe [GRF] may be engaged in activities that
violate the [IEEPA]. 20 2 No specific grounds were stated before or
after the freeze of GRF's assets. Contesting the blocking order
would only be possible through the designated administrative
procedures determined by OFAC. 20 3 However, GRF was unable to

produce a defense because it could not obtain the secret evidence
that OFAC was using to validate the freezing of its assets.20 4
Global Relief Foundation sought an injunction and declaratory
judgment in federal district court to release the seized materials
and unfreeze its funds while investigations were ongoing.2 5 GRF
argued that the blocking of its assets and seizure of records was
both unlawful and unconstitutional. The district court denied its
motions, finding that GRF was unlikely to succeed on the merits.
GRF claimed that the IEEPA's humanitarian exception did not
preclude an organization from the right to provide humanitarian
aid to any possible recipient, even those closely associated with
terrorism. 26 The court disagreed. It claimed that the President
had the power to block any humanitarian aid as long as he first
declared a national emergency and showed that this particular aid
impaired his ability to deal with an emergency. 2 7 The district
court also rejected GRF's claim that E.O. 13,224 was
unconstitutionally vague for its failure to define the phrase
"associated with a person determined to be a terrorist. '2 8 The
court deemed that the vagueness issue was not ripe for review
because, as stated previously, GRF had not been labeled an SDGT
and the U.S. Treasury Department was blocking its assets while

Id. at 792.
See U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Sanctions
Programs
Summaries,
Anti-Terrorism,
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.shtml.
204 Global Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 787; see also Nice-Peterson, supra
note 143, at 1390.
205 Global Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 787; see also Ruff, supra note 108, at
459.
206 Id. at 794.
207 Id. at 795.
208 Id. at 802.
202
203
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investigating the possible links to terrorist financing.2" 9 In dealing
with lack of pre-deprivation notice the court stated:
Due to exigencies of national security and foreign
policy considerations, the Executive branch
historically has not provided pre-deprivation notice
in sanction programs under the IEEPA.
The
actions taken by the Executive branch pursuant to
these statutes are procedurally and substantively
different from other types of governmental conduct
in that they first require a declaration of war or
national emergency arising, at least in part, outside
the United States.2 10
On October 18, 2002, OFAC designated GRF as an SDGT.2 11
The Treasury Department's statement regarding the designation of
GRF explained that GRF "[h]as connections to, has provided
support for, and has provided assistance to Usama bin Ladin, the
al-Qaida Network, and other known terrorists groups. 212 The
press release stated that one of the founders of GRF was a member
of Makhtab Al-Dhidamat, the precursor organization to alQaeda. 213 GRF officials were found to be closely connected to
Osama bin Laden and the Taliban after it was subjected to
international sanctions. 14 The evidence of links against the
foundation seemed quite intricate and substantive. Evidence
shows that GRF published various newsletters requesting
donations
for God's cause - they [the Zakat funds] are
disbursed for equipping the raiders, for the
purchase of ammunition and food, and for their [the
Id. at 803; see also Ruff, supra note 108, at 462.
Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 803 (2002); see also
Palestine Information Office v. Schultz, 853 F.2d 932, 94243 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (standing
for the proposition that no governmental interest is more important than the security of
the nation).
211 Global Relief Found., Inc., v. N.Y. Times Co., No. 01 C 8821, 2003 WL 403135,
at *4 (N.D. Il. Feb. 20, 2003).
212 For the government's announcement of actions against Global Relief
Foundation, see Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
Statement Regarding the Designation of Global Relief Foundation (Oct. 18, 2002),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3553.htm (last visited Sept. 1,2008).
213 Id.
214 Id.
209
210
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Mujahideen's] transportation so that they can raise
God the Almighty's word... it is likely that the most
important of disbursement of Zakat in our times is
on the jihad for God's cause....215
C. Benevolence InternationalFoundation
Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) is an Illinoisbased charitable nonprofit corporation administering humanitarian
aid to individuals afflicted by war, natural disaster, and extreme
poverty. 216 As with GRF and HLF, the U.S. government acted
upon suspicions that BIF had ties to terrorism. 217 Due to
suspicions regarding BIF's actions possibly violating the IEEPA,
on December 14, 2001, OFAC issued a notice to BIF stating that
the U.S. government had reason to believe that BIF may be
engaged in activities that violate the IEEPA. 218 The letter was
accompanied with blocking of all BIF funds, accounts, and
business records in accordance with the IEEPA.1 9
The
government demanded the immediate production and surrender of
all records, including computer files.220 Chicago offices of BIF
and the home of BIF's Chief Executive Officer Enaam Arnaout
were subsequently raided, and mass financial records were
seized.22 1 As with the previous two charities, BIF was never given
specific evidence leading to the governments blocking order. BIF
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, challenging the blocking order on grounds
similar to GIF, claiming that the blocking order violated statutory
and constitutional rights. 2 Due to the fact that BIF was unable to
financially support the continuance of the case, the case was
voluntarily dismissed.223
Id.
Benevolence Int'l Found., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp.2d 935, 936 (2002).
217 Id.
218 Id.; see also Office of Foreign Assets Control, Recent OFAC Actions (Dec. 14,
2001),
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20011214a.html
(last
visited Feb. 17, 2008).
219 Benevolence Int'l Found., 200 F. Supp. 2d at 936.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 937.
222 Id. at 941; see also Ruff, supra note 108, at 462.
223 Nice-Peterson, supra note 143, at 1402.
215

216
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On November 19, 2002, BIF was designated as an SDGT 4
The Department of Treasury deemed that BIF had provided
support for and had been linked to al-Qaeda and its operatives.225
BIF was also linked to both Mamdouh Mahumud Salim, a
lieutenant present at the founding of al-Qaeda, as well as
Mahamed Loay Bayazid, who was implicated in several U.S.
embassy bombings.226 Enaam Arnaout was later convicted in the
United States for operating BIF as a racketeering enterprise.227
D. Islamic American ReliefAssociation - USA
Islamic American Relief Association - USA (IARA) was the
United States branch of the Islamic African Relief Agency, an
international charity found to be linked to terrorism. In Islamic
American ReliefAgency v. Gonzales,228 the court held that the U.S.
government did not exceed its statutory authority under the IEEPA
when it blocked assets of the relief organization. Since IARA was
found to be a branch of an organization placed on the SDGT list, it
was deemed to have terrorist ties.229 "[B]ased on the September
11t h terrorist attacks... and the state of national emergency" the
court held that a sufficient basis existed for the government's
conclusion that the agency and its branch subsidiary posed an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the United States. 230
On October 13, 2004, OFAC designated IARA as an SDGT.3
OFAC concluded that IARA provided "financial support or other
services to persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support
terrorism. 2 32 This designation meant that none of JARA's assets,
including the U.S. subsidiary IARA-USA, could be "transferred,
withdrawn, exported, paid, or otherwise dealt in without prior
224 Id.

225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.

228 Islamic American Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, (D.C. Cir. 2007).
229 Id.
230 Id. at 728-30.

231 For the government's actions against IARA, see Office of Public Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, Departmentof Treasury Designates Global Network, Senior Officials

of lARA for Supporting bin Laden, Others (Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/js2025.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
232 Id.
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authorization from OFAC.,, 23 3 IARA-USA was no longer able to
use its offices or remove any items of corporate property.2 34
Unofficially, IARA-USA was extinguished.2 35
IARA-USA soon filed suit refuting the OFAC designation,
naming the Attorney General, the Secretary of Treasury, and other
unidentified FBI agents and Department of Treasury personnel as
defendants. 23 6 IARA-USA claimed the blocking of its assets was
unsupported by the record. 237 The court of appeals reviewed the
designation under the APA, and thus the APA's highly deferential
Under this standard, the court
standard of review applied.
would only set aside OFAC's action if it was "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.,, 239 The designation was upheld in federal court. 240 The
government produced evidence in support of a determination that
the U.S. branch of an international charity linked
IARA-USA was
241
to terrorism.
IARA-USA was shut down in 2004.242 In January 2008, a
federal grand jury indicted the IARA and several of its former
officers with eight new counts of engaging in illegal financial
transactions for the benefit of US-designated terrorist Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar.2 43
These superceding indictments added to the
original charges stemming from its 2004 placement on the
Specially Designated Global Terrorist List, and in March 6, 2007,
five officers where charged for violating federal sanctions by

Id.
Id.
235 Id.
236 See Islamic American ReliefAgency, 447 F.3d at 732-33.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 732.
240 Id.
241 Ruff, supra note 108, at 463-64; see also Matt Kelley, Judge Upholds
Designation of Missouri Charity as Terror Front, BEAUMONT ENTERPRISE, Feb. 20,
2005, http://www.beaumontenterprise.com/news/judgeupholds-designation-ofmissour
i charityas terror-front_06-25-2008_10_09_12.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
242 Jim Kouri, Islamic Charity and Former Congressman Indicted for Terrorist
Financing,AMERICAN CHRONICLE (Jan. 19, 2008), http://www.americanchronicle.com/
articles/49494 (last visited Sept. 1,2008).
233

234

243 Id.
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misusing IARA's charitable status to raise funds for an unlawful
purpose.244 It is important to note that both indictments failed to
charge IARA or its chief officers with material support of
terrorism, and did not allege that IARA knowingly financed
terrorism. The indictments alleged that the defendants engaged in
financial transactions in violation of the IEEPA, and these
transactions benefited property controlled by a U.S.-designated
terrorist organization.2 45
IARA-USA garnered much attention because it was
discovered that a mosque established and funded by retired NBA
basketball star Hakeem "The Dream" Olajuwon gave more than
$80,000 to the Islamic African Relief Agency.24 6 Olajuwon, like
much of the American Muslim community, claims to have had no
knowledge of the links to terrorism, believing that the Islamic
African Relief Agency was a legitimate organization dedicated to
helping the needy in Africa.247 The Islamic African Relief Agency
was later found to have supported Hamas and offered financial
support to Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), another organization
listed as an SDGT pursuant to E.O. 13,224.248
As seen in the previous four cases, USA Patriot Act Title I,
section 106 has elicited various challenges and complaints of due
process deprivation. 24 9 By increasing the President's power over
property, assets of organizations, or foreign persons by permitting
the submission of evidence in support of government action on an
ex-parte, in camera basis, the government may subvert multiple
due process considerations.
This amendment to the
International Emergency Powers Act specifically states:
Id.
Id.
246 See Associated Press, Olajuwon Says He Didn't Know of Terrorism Ties, Feb.
10, 2005, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=1987790 (last visited
Sept. 1, 2008).
247 Id.
248 See Ruff, supra note 108, at 464.
249 See, e.g., Joan M. O'Sullivan-Butler, Combating Money Laundering and
International Terrorism: Does the USA Patriot Act Require the Judicial System to
Abandon Fundamental Due Process in the Name of Homeland Security?, 16 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 395 (2004) (discussing whether the government's use of secret evidence
to justify a challenged blocking order represents a violation of the fundamental due
process rights of the aggrieved party).
250 See USA PATRIOT Act § 106(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2003).
244
245
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In any judicial review of a determination made under
this section, if the determination was based on
classified information (as defined in section l(a) of the
Classified Information Act) such information may be
submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in
camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any
" '
right to judicial review.25
As explained by the Attorney General, the need for this
provision materializes in the government's ability to identify and
neutralize terrorist networks.2 52 Should national security measures
such as section 106 preempt constitutional due process concerns?
Utilizing this provision allows the U.S. government to do more
than freeze bank accounts; it allows the seizure of assets related to
groups identified as allegedly associated or providing material
support to any alleged terrorist organizations. 53
The Patriot Act does not deny the accused judicial review in
the absolute. In fact, judicial review is pronounced in section
316(a) of the Patriot Act.254 This provision permits owners of
confiscated property to file federal lawsuits challenging OFAC's
determination that the property was utilized in furtherance of
terrorism."' However, this judicial review could be rendered
meaningless since evidence may be suspended if the court deems
that compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence could
implicate national security interests.256
With balance
understandably tipping in the government's favor, the court must
weigh the need to protect the sanctity of confidential information,
which could leak information allowing terrorists to subvert
government investigation, with the potential that the right to a fair
251 USA PATRIOT Act § 106(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2003); see also Classified
Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. Appx. § 1(a)(2003). Section 1(a) defines
classified information as "[a]ny information or material that has been determined by the
United States Government pursuant to an Executive order, statute, or regulation, to
require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security ...
see also O'Sullivan-Butler, supra note 249, at 14.
252 O'Sullivan-Butler, supra note 249, at 4414.
253 18 U.S.C. § 2339(a) (stating that the term "material support or resources means
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary
instruments or financial securities .... ").
254 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 316.
255 Id.
256 O'Sullivan-Butler, supra note 249, at 415.
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trial will be violated." 7 In the cases previously discussed, the
court was required to determine which interest should prevail. In
evaluating the procedures used in these cases the courts considered
the following:
(1) the interest at stake for the charitable organizations;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation through the
procedures used; (3) the probable value of additional or
different safeguards; (4) and the interest of the
government in utilizing ex-parte, in camera, due
process-lacking procedures rather than those which
coincide with constitutional principles.25
In each instance, national security was determined to be more
vital.
We now turn to the due process deprivations that resonate
throughout the previous cases, once again emphasizing the
necessity for the reader to question whether the government must
use these policies to avoid another 9/11 or whether the lines of the
Constitution have blurred so as to render the Constitution
meaningless.
V. Skimming the Line of Due Process: A Critique of the
Terrorist Designation Process
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits the
government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.259 The present due process regime
requires that each side be permitted to rebut the adversary's
evidence by fostering evidence to the contrary. 6 ° Under new antiterrorism legislation, the government's eradication of due process
protection affords the defendant no ability to confront any
classified evidence used to designate a charitable entity as funding
terrorism. 261 Moreover, the new legislation allows blocking of
assets pending investigation.262 The threat posed, therefore, is the
257

Id.

258 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 30, 103 S.Ct. 321, 330 (1982);

see also

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902-03 (1976).
259 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property ... ").
260 O'Sullivan-Butler, supra note 250, at 414.
261 Selden, supra note 138, at 538.
262 Id.

2009

BENEVOLENT BLOOD MONEY

blocking of assets based on scarce or irrelevant evidence. 63 In
cases where the government does have sufficient evidence to
designate an entity, risk of error still pervades the procedures
provided to these charitable organizations.264
Many designated charitable organizations claim that they are
being deprived of their property, which includes financial as well
as physical assets, without due process.265 An organization
designated as a terrorist organization under the IEEPA remains
ignorant of the designation until it realizes that its assets are
frozen, which can be triggered by a mere investigation into its
activities. 66 One civil liberties organization claims "once a
charitable organi[z]ation is so designated.., the charity is unable
to see the government's evidence and thus understand the basis for
the charges. Since its assets are frozen it lacks resources to mount
'
a defen[s]e."267
These classified ex-parte, in camera evidence
proceedings have been the basis of the majority of erroneous
deprivation claims.268 Using secret evidence to justify deprivation
gives these charities no meaningful opportunity to test the

authenticity of information being used to deprive its assets.2 69
"[N]o better instrument has been devised for arriving at the truth
than to give a person in jeopardy of serious270loss notice of the case
against him and the opportunity to meet it."

The final procedural deficiency stems from the lack of review
given to blocking orders. The only evidence reviewable by a court
once an OFAC designation occurs is the administrative record
compiled by the agency. 271 The charitable entity is not allowed to
submit additional evidence.272 Since the IEEPA contains no
provision for judicial review, review is conducted under APA
Id.
Id.
265 See Sahar Aziz, supra note 147, at 65.
266 See Global Relief Found., 207 F.Supp.2d at 779.
267 See William Fisher, Muslim Charities, Guilty Until Proven Innocent?, MEDIA
FOR FREEDOM, http://www.mediaforfreedom.com/ReadArticle.asp?ArticlelD=8840 (last
visited Sept. 1, 2008).
268 Nice-Peterson, supra note 143, at 1407.
269 Id.
270 Id. (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972)).
271 Nice-Peterson, supra note 143, at 1407.
272 Id.
263

264
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guidelines.273 Under the APA, the review is conducted under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard giving an almost definite
victory to the government.274 Under this standard, an action by the
government is only held invalid if it is deemed to be arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.275 This strong deference
seemingly leads to affirmation of all OFAC designations.276 In
combination with this deference, OFAC decisions disrupt the
balance of national security and civil rights. The government
reviews these designations on an ex-parte, in camera evidence
proceeding using "unprecedented freedom from judicial or
congressional oversight." 277 National security, arguably rightly
so, seems to overwhelm the assertion of procedural due process
rights in every case.278
Because identifying terrorist ties is a difficult task, the room
for error is large.279 OFAC's freezing of assets deals with
individuals and entities from around the world and difficult-toidentify sources from certain target nations.28° It should not be
overlooked that due process of law is not for the sole benefit of the
charities in this instance. It is in the best interest of the
government to protect itself against mishaps that leave lasting
bound to occur in exstains on our system of justice, which are
28
parte evidentiary and review proceedings. '
In considering these due process deficiencies resulting from
deference to national security, we must remember that the
government was forced to act swiftly before more targets could
273 Administrative Procedure Act, § 5 U.S.C. 555 (2000); see also Nice-Peterson,
supra note 143, at 1407.
274 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).

275 Nice-Peterson, supra note 143, at 1407.
276 Id. at 1408 (quoting Peter L. Fitzgerald, "If Property Rights Were Treated Like
Human Rights, They Could Never Get Away With This": Blacklisting and Due Process
in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs,51 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 136 (1999)).

277 See id. ("Decisions made by OFAC receive even greater deference because they
involve matters of national security or foreign policy" (citations omitted)).
278 Selden, supra note 138, at 554.
279 Id.
280 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S.Ct.
309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950) (holding the U.S. could exclude the alien wife of a citizen who
had served in the armed forces of the United States during World War 11 without
hearing).
281 Selden, supra note 138, at 553.
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react and subvert previous U.S. restrictions."' Moreover, in
dealing with charities, precautions needed to be taken before these
organizations were able to move assets or money elsewhere.283 As
previously stated, these limitations on due process do not occur
spontaneously; they occur only after the charity is given a terrorist
designation by the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of the Treasury, and the Attorney General.284 After 9/11, President
285
Bush declared, "money is the lifeblood of terrorism.,
Recognizing that this "lifeblood" was being supplied by charities,
the government understood that necessary means needed to be
taken.286
It is important to bear in mind that both the IEEPA provisions
for the discretionary use of evidence, and the use of ex-parte, in
camera review have been deemed constitutional. 287

Although

charities make valid arguments about the difficulties that arise in
these procedures, the government's notion of national security
seems to trump all interests. While the government has a
compelling argument for nondisclosure and secret evidence, the
judiciary must make sure that the national security argument
pervading throughout the designation of these entities is not being
abused. However, since precedent has established the national
security argument extremely successfully, the ability to exploit its
use becomes even more omnipresent.
VI. First Amendment Claims of Charities
"Woe to the idolaters,who do not pay the Zakat, and who deny
the Hereafter."288

As stated within the Qur'an, charitable giving is a necessary
Id. at 502.
See id. (noting that some charitable organizations divert donations to finance
suicide bombs and other attacks).
284 Id. at 497.
285 PETER BROOKES, A DEVIL'S TRIANGLE: TERRORISM, WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION, AND ROGUE STATES 52 (2005).
286 Selden, supra note 138, at 502 (noting that some terrorist entities, including al
Qaeda, raise money by convincing donors that their donations will go to orphans and
widows, when in actuality the donations are sent to suicide bombers).
287 Laura K. Donahue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and United
States, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 303, 413 (2006).
288 Holy Qur'an 41:6-7.
282
283
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aspect of the Muslim faith. 219 However, this faith-based claim
seems to have no reversible effect on OFAC designations. The
courts have consistently found that terrorist designations and
blocking orders do not violate a charity's right to speech,
association, or free exercise of religion.2 90 In multiple instances,
First Amendment freedom of religion claims were considered
moot because the charitable organizations had failed to hold
themselves out as religious-based organizations. 291 HLF claimed
that the blocking order imposed by the government pursuant to
designation as an SDGT violated its First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion and the free exercise rights of its donors.2 92
Within its petition, HLF alleged that OFAC violated the Religious
Freedoms Restoration Act. 293 The D.C. District Court split HLF's
claims into two parts: (1) HLF's claim of substantial burden on its
free exercise of religion, and (2) its claims of substantial burden
brought on behalf of its Muslim employees and donors. 294 HLF
argued that its charitable work fulfilled its religious obligation of
Zakat and that following this pillar of Islam was an exercise of
religious rights. 295 The court worked its way around this defense
by reasoning that HLF had failed to prove that it was a religious
organization per se.2 96 Thereby, HLF failed to establish that the
organization was exercising religious beliefs. 297 HLF had defined
itself to the court as a "nonprofit charitable corporation" without
reference to religious character. 29' Regarding its claim on behalf
289 See, e.g., Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 806 (N.D.
1I. 2002).
290 See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57,
83 (D.D.C. 2002).
291 Id. at 82.
292 id. at 83.
293 Id.; see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb1(b) (2002) (declaring that the government may substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion only if the burden is (1) in furtherance of a compelling government interest
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest).
294 Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 83.
295 Id.
296 id.

297 See id. ("Although charitable activities may constitute religious exercise if
performed by religious believers for religious reasons, HLF has not established that, as
an organization, it made these contributions as an exercise of its own religious beliefs.").
298 Id.
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of employees and donors, the court concluded that HLF did not
have associational standing to raise these claims, finding that
claims surrounding free exercise of religion required individual
participation to prove the extent of burden the government had
placed on religious practices.299 On appeal the Court of Appeals
for the District Columbia revisited the issue of whether the
Religious Freedoms Restorations Act (RFRA) could be implicated
in this situation.300 The circuit court affirmed on grounds that the
Constitution gives "[n]o free exercise right to fund terrorists."' '
The court went on to state that "preventing such a corporation
from aiding terrorists did not2 violate any right contemplated in the
30
Constitution or the RFRA.
Recently, Emadaddin Z. Muntasser, a Muslim, was accused of
misleading the government about the nature of Care International
Inc. ("Care"), a charity the government claims supported the
jihadist and mujahedin; he argued that funding jihad is a religious
right.30 3 His attorney, Susan Estrich, argued that the right to solicit
or promote religious efforts, which includes funding jihad, is
protected by the Constitution . 304 Her memorandum in support of
her motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of
unconstitutional treatment of the laws contends that "Care was set
up to advance religious goals; jihad is a religious concept; [Z]akat
is a religious obligation; support for the [mujahedin] is, according
30 5
to certain interpretations of the [Qur'an], a religious command.,
She further argues that "[i]t is absolutely clear that the
government is not free to prefer one religion over another: if Jews
and Catholics are free to raise money and support their chosen
causes domestically and internationally, no different rules may be
applied ..

306

Id.
300 Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
301 Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 166-167 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
302 Id. at 167.
303 United States v. Mubayyid, 476 F. Supp. 2d 46, 47 (D. Mass. 2007) (defining
"jihad" as "Islamic holy war" and "mujahideen" as "holy warriors").
304 Id. at 51.
299

305 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Incorporated Memorandum at 38, U.S. v.
Mubayyid, No. 05-40026, 2005 WL 5660269 (D. Mass. 2005).
306 Id. at 36.
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Muntasser had been charged with scheming to conceal the fact
that Care was an outgrowth of the A1-Kigah Refugee Center, an
organization that was linked to the bombing of the World Trade
Center in New York in 1993.307 The government contended that
had the IRS known that Care was raising monetary funds for j ihad,
it would not have been granted 501(c)(3) nonprofit status. °8
Although Estrich's argument could be labeled radical, it is backed
by beliefs found within the Muslim population. As seen in section
205(c)(3) of the I.R.C., a not-for-profit organization utilizing funds
for the advancement of religion is entitled to a tax exemption.3 9
Arguably, when Care was using Zakat towards funding jihad or
mujahedin, it was advancing the Muslim religion. The U.S.
government denied First Amendment rights in this situation,
acknowledging that national security interests preempt any
organization's First Amendment religious rights.
VII. Wins for Civil Rights or Wins for Terrorists?
Two recent cases have rendered verdicts that take a turn
towards expanding civil rights. An argument can be made that the
circumstances surrounding these two cases suggest triumphs for
those who seek to support terrorism through financial means.3"'
The first of these holdings seems to limit penalties for supporting
"'
terrorism to criminal proceedings.31
The second case directly
asserts that parts of the Patriot Act are unconstitutionally vague.3" 2

307
308

Mubayyid, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 48.
Id. at 52.

309 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (noting "corporations, and any community chest,
fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious purposes" are
entitled to tax exemption).
310 See, e.g.,
Posting of Andrew Cochran to Counterterrorism Blog,
http://www.counterterrorismblog.org/ (Dec. 29, 2007, 2:12 EST) ("[Requiring] a more
direct causal link ... between the defendants and the murders ... make[s] it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for terrorism victims to receive compensation from those
whose funds made a particular attack possible.").
311 See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1028 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding funding, simpliciter, of a foreign terrorist organization is insufficient to
constitute an act of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2331). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2331
(2000) (defining terms "international terrorism" and "domestic terrorism.").
312 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1134-35 (9th Cir.
2007).
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A. Boim v. QuranicLiteracy Institute:3 3 The Civil Case
The 1991 Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) allows recourse for U.S.
citizens who have sustained injuries as a result of activities of
foreign terrorist organizations in that it allows injured persons,
their estates, survivors, or heirs to recover threefold the damages
sustained, as well as the cost of bringing suit, including attorney
fees.3 14 However, the ATA does not allow the U.S., foreign states
or government officials to be named as defendants, and it excludes
'
suits resulting from "an act of war."315
In 1996, Congress enacted
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
allowing federal courts jurisdiction over claims by U.S. citizens
alleging injury at the hands of state-sponsored terrorism.3 16 Acting
as an effective amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA), the AEDPA mandates that the defendant be identified
as a state-sponsor of terrorism by the U.S. State Department to
maintain the lawsuit. 17
Although infrequent, suits have been brought utilizing the
AEPDA and the ATA.318 In one case that is illustrative of the
successful utilization of the ATA against several charitable
organizations is Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute,319 In Boim,
the plaintiffs were the parents of David Boim, who was shot and
killed by Islamic Terrorists on Israel's West Bank in 1996.3"0
They named as defendants Amjad Hinawi and Khalil Tawfiq AlSharif, two individuals directly involved in the murder of their
son, along with several U.S. individuals and U.S.-based charitable
313 Boim, 291 F.3d 1000.
314

18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2004).

315 See Richard K. Milin, Suing Terrorists and Their Private and State Supporters,

N.Y. L. J., Oct. 29, 2001, at S3.
316 Rudolph Lehrer, Comment, Unbalancingthe Terrorists' Checkbook: Analysis of
U.S. Policy in Its Economic War on InternationalTerrorism,10 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

333, 354 (2002).
317 Id. at 355.

318 See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998)
(awarding $247 million in damages to plaintiffs for daughter's death in a Hizballah
terrorist attack funded by Iran); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.
Fla. 1997) (awarding $187 million to plaintiffs for loss of family members killed by the
Cuban Air Force).
319 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889 (N.D. I11.
2004), aff'd
Boim, 291 F. 3d 1000.
320 Id.
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organizations that allegedly supported Hamas.32 ' Pursuant to
summary judgment against several defendants, including HLF,
OFAC stepped in to seize and freeze multiple assets.322
Issues surrounding liability of and damages against the
Quranic Literacy Institute (QLI) went to trial 323 To prevail on
their claim against QLI, the Boims had to prove that QLI
"provided material support" to Hamas.3 24 The trial court held that
the evidence presented by the Boims was sufficient to prove that
their son was murdered by Hamas terrorists, and that defendants
had knowingly provided material support to Hamas.325 On
December 8, 2004, the three Islamic charities named as defendants
3 26
were ordered to pay $156 million to the parents of David Boim.
However, on December 28, 2007, a federal appeals court
overturned the $156 million award.327
The appeals court ruled that the Boims failed to show a link
between the contributions from the American Islamic charities'
contributions to the militant organization Hamas and to David
Boim's shooting death.328 The Boim's theory was that in
promoting, raising money, and otherwise working with and on the
behalf of Hamas or its affiliates, the defendants, including HLF,
3 29
helped to fund, train, and arm the terrorists that killed their son.
William Neal, a juror in the case, told the media that the
government's evidence "was pieced together over the course of a
decade - a phone call this year, a message another year.' 330
Instead of trying to prove that the defendants knew they were
supporting terrorists, Neal stated that the prosecutors "danced
around the wire transfers by showing us videos of little kids in
Id.
322 Id. at 893.
323 Id. at 931.
324 Id. at 891 (quoting Boim, 291 F. 3d at 1016).
325 Boim, supra note 319, at 899.
326 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 511 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir.
2007); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., No. 00 C 2905, 2004 WL 2931337, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 14, 2004).
321

327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Id.

at 709-10.

330 Adam Liptak and Leslie Eaton, Financing Mistrial Adds to U.S. Missteps in
TerrorProsecutions,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at A16.
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bomb belts and people singing about Hamas, things that didn't
directly relate to the case."33' John Beal, lawyer for QLI, went on
to say that "[t]hese cases are about a Middle Eastern political
'
dispute that does not belong in an American Courtroom."332
"This
case was a paradigmatic example of the laws being thrown out the
window because of the pain and fear and anger that all of us felt
after Sept[ember] 11," said attorney Matthew Piers.333 "If we
'
break our laws in moments like this, the bad guys win."334
The
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) stated, "This
landmark ruling is a strong rejection of the recent disturbing trend
of political lawsuits against American Muslims who have
committed no crime other than providing humanitarian aid to
Palestinians.

33 5

The court in the Boim case admitted evidence to refute claims
made by the decedent's parents.33 6 While this was a civil case,
with the ramifications of the decision not affecting national
security, the decision nonetheless illustrates the effectiveness of
allowing evidence in rebuttal of terrorist claims-the individuals
labeled as supporting terrorists and ultimately blamed for the death
of a soldier were able to defeat this branding through a fair judicial
process. The mere fact that the "terrorist supporters" in this
instance did not have to pay for David Boim's death may be
labeled by some as a victory for terrorists and their financial
supporters, as well as a legal defeat for the 337
Bush, and now Obama,
administration's ongoing "War on Terror.
331 Id.

332 Maurice Possley, Terror Suit Award Tossed Out, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 29,

2007, at 1.
333 John O'Connor, $156M Terrorism Damage Award Thrown Out, USA TODAY,
Dec. 28, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-12-28-3435293687x.htm
(last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
334 Id.

335 Paul Icainina, U.S. Court Overturns Ruling On $156M Payment by Muslim
Charities to Family, ALL HEADLINE NEWS (Dec. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7009575606 (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
336 Boim, 511 F.3d at 711 (7th Cir. 2007).
337 See, e.g., Leslie Eaton, U.S. Prosecution of Muslim Group Ends in Mistrial, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 23, 2007, at Al ("The decision is a stunning setback for the government,
there's no other way of looking at it." (quotations omitted)); Kate Randall, No
Convictions in US Terror Trial Against Muslim Charity, WORLD SOCIALIST WEBSITE
(Oct. 25, 2007), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/oct2007/musl-o25_m.html ("The
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B. PatriotAct Definition of 'Supportfor Terrorism'Partially
Held Unconstitutional
On December 10, 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the AEDPA's
prohibition of providing "material support or resources" to
designated terrorist organizations was unconstitutionally vague in
Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey.338 The definition of
"material support or resources" included, inter alia, the terms
"service," "training" and "expert advice and assistance."3 39
'
The
court explained that "vague statutes are invalid for three reasons:
1) to avoid punishing people for behavior they could not have
known was illegal; 2) to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement by government officers; and 3) to avoid any chilling
effect on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms., 34" The
provisions made it a crime to support "foreign terrorist
organizations" be it training, expert advice, assistance, or
personnel. 34 ' These actions were taken pursuant to a 2005 ruling
by Judge Audrey B. Collins of the U.S. District Court, Central
Court of California, who deemed two provisions of E.O. 13,224
impermissibly vague because they allowed the President to
unilaterally designate organizations as terrorist groups and broadly
prohibit association with such groups.34 2
In their original
complaint, Humanitarian Law Project asserted that the law
compels a "guilt by association standard" under which innocent
individuals could be punished for supporting good works of an
organization engaged in illicit activities.343
This seems to be a win for both charities and individual donors
that fear prosecution for providing benign assistance to foreign
groups that subsequently have been added to OFAC's SDT or
SDGT list. "The court's decision confirms that even in fighting

mistrial is a blow to the Bush Administration's attempt in its ongoing 'war on terror' to
convict the charity as a front for the Islamic Hamas organization.").
338 Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007).
339 Id. at 1128.
340 Id. at 1133.
341 Id. at 1136.
342 See Dan Eggen, Judge Strikes Down Parts of Executive Order on Terrorism,
WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2006, at A12.
343 Id.
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terror, unchecked executive authority and trampling on
fundamental freedoms is not a permissible option." 3" However,
fear of prosecution for donating to a hidden terrorist charity still
pervades the Muslim American community.
VIII. U.S. Muslims Fear Donating to Charities
If you have any involvement in the financing of the al
Qaida organization, you have two choices: cooperate in
this fight, or we will freeze your U.S. assets; we will
punish you for providing the resources that make these
evil acts possible. We will succeed in starving the
terrorists of funding and shutting down the institutions
that support or facilitate terrorism.345
Triggered by fear that their charitable donations could bring
unwanted attention from the U.S. government, and perhaps link
them to terrorism, many Muslim Americans are backing away
from Muslim-based charities.34 6 This fear often leads to a moral
dilemma for Muslim Americans. They may either follow the
pillars of Islam, which include Zakat, or forget about their religion
and needy Muslims around the world for fear of government
intrusion. Najah Bazzy established Zaman International in order
to provide for needy Muslim communities around the world.3 47
Her inability to obtain charity funds stems from the fear resonating
in the Muslim community. The largest donations she receives
come in the form of anonymous wads of $100 bills stuffed into
envelopes.348 No one wants his or her name traced to the donation.
Much of the fear comes from brawny U.S. government action that
the Muslim American community views as unnecessarily
invasive.349

344 See id. (citing David Cole, a Georgetown University law professor who helped to
represent the plaintiff).
345 U.S. Dep't Treasury, Contributions by the Department of the Treasury to the
Financial War on Terrorism: Fact Sheet, Sept. 2002 (citing Treasury Secretary Paul
O'Neill, Sept. 24, 2001).
346 Neil MacFarquhar, Fears of Inquiry Dampen Giving by U.S. Muslims, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at Al.
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 Id.
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Prior to 9/11, utilization of IRC section 501(1)(c)(3) 5 0 and
other statutory frameworks allowing examination of the records of
religious charities were seldom, if ever, invoked.3 11 Applying such
statutes to scrutinize the finances of a religious organization was
virtually unheard of. 52 The U.S. government was hesitant to
investigate any link between questionable donations and Islamic
charities existing within the sovereign.5 3 Factors stemming from
Muslim voter sentiment and questionable civil rights infractions
led to over-wariness in order to avoid disenfranchising
minorities. 54 With more than 1,200 mosques and 426 Muslim
associations in the United States, and with most of those
institutions collecting Zakat and Sadaqah, the complications not
only existed in substance, but in magnitude.5 '
In 1999, the Muslim community presented the Clinton
35 6
Administration with guidelines acceptable to Islamic charities.
These guidelines sought to strengthen mainstream Muslims
against the increasing attacks upon them by fundamental
Islamists. 57 Those in the Muslim community were willing to
"adopt a policy of complete transparency," and they appeared
"eager to show the government where the money comes from what
they use it for. 3 58 The U.S. government failed to respond. When
the Muslim community again came forward after 9/11 seeking
"federally sanctioned guidelines" in order to "conduct a thorough
legal and financial audit, one that will provide a clean bill of
health," the U.S. government was again unresponsive. 9 The U.S.
government's post-9/1 1 attack and its efforts to shut down many
charities, combined with the fact that charity is one of the basic
tenets of Islam, dispersed a false impression that all Muslim
charities were supporting terrorism. In line with this fear, the
350
351

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2002).
See BURR, supra note 6, at 265.

352 Id.
353 Id.
354
355
356

Id. at 266.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 266.

See BURR, supra note 6, at 266.
Id. (citing Salam AI-Marayati, Indict Individuals, Not Charities, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2002, at A33).
359 Id.
357

358
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Muslim community feels that its charitable organizations were
being targeted because they were providing assistance in high-risk
areas throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.3 6 Multiple
non-Muslim charitable organizations send monetary aid to these
areas, yet a nominal amount of these non-Muslim organizations
have been designated as supporting terrorism. As a result of these
inequities, the Muslim community within the United States feels
361
as though they are being singled out on the basis of religion.
While the U.S. government may have legitimate reasons for
freezing assets and blocking funds, the perception still exists that
the U.S. government has attacked the Muslim community on the
basis of religion.362
IX.The Treasury Department and the Muslim Community in
America
Commencing Ramadan in 2004, the Secretary of Treasury
issued a statement cautioning Muslims against giving charitable
contributions to questionable groups: "[w]hen you open your
hearts to charity during Ramadan, we encourage you to educate
yourself in the activities of the charities in which you donate, to
help ensure that your generosity is not exploited for nefarious
purposes. 363 Within the statement was a list of groups that had
been previously designated as supporting terrorists and that had
been blacklisted.364 The statement also served as a reminder that it
was a crime to support any of these groups or terrorist-ridden
organizations in any fashion. 365 Laila Al-Marayati argues that
suspicion linked to Muslim charities denotes an assumption by the
U.S. government that every instance of a Muslim giving overseas
should be examined.366 The U.S. Department of Treasury
continues to closely examine the Muslim community since the

360 Laila A1-Marayati, Symposium: The Anti-Terrorist Guidelines: The Impact on
InternationalPhilanthropy,25 PACE L. REV.321, 329 (2004).
361 See id.
362 Id. at 335-37.

363 A1-Marayati, supra note 360, at 336.
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 Id.
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passing of E.O. 13,224 in order to catch funds directed at terrorist
entities.367 In 2002, the U.S. Department of Treasury issued AntiTerrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.
Based Charities. 368 These guidelines were introduced as a
response to demands from the Muslim American community.369 In
2005, the guidelines were revised to take into account comments
obtained from the charitable community, notably the ArabAmerican and Islamic-American communities, on how to best
safeguard charitable giving from misuse by terrorists and increase
awareness of the very real threat terrorist groups pose.3 7 ° The
revised guidelines were released for public comment in 2005.371
These recommendations provided guidelines to assist charities that
attempt in good faith "to protect themselves from terrorist
abuse., 372 The guidelines were also used to provide due diligence
to the pillar of Zakat.373 Charities were advised to apply a "riskbased" approach, especially when granting funds to those
organizations abroad due to the increased risk associated with
overseas charitable activity.37 4 Charities were expected to collect
basic information about the grantee, including the grantee's
projects and goals. In order to properly check backgrounds,
charities were to check OFAC's SDN List, as well as the Terrorist
Exclusion List (TEL).37 5 Both of these lists are made available to
the public.376
On September 29, 2006, the Treasury Department released its
third version of the Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines.377 In the
367 Id.
368 U.S. Dep't of Treasury Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best
Practices for U.S. Based Charities [hereinafter Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines],
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/0929%20finalrevised.pdf
(last visited
Sept. 1, 2008).
369 Al-Marayati, supra note 360.
370 Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, supra note 368, at 8.
371 Id.
372

Id.at 9.

373 Id.

Id.at 2.
Id.at 14.
376 See Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially
Designated Nationals List, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/ (last
visited Sept. 1, 2008).
377 Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, supra note 368.
374
375
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annex to this version, the Treasury Department sought to inform
the Muslim population of terrorists' abuse of the charitable sector.
It explains that terrorist organizations utilize benevolence in order
to radicalize vulnerable populations and cultivate support for their
cause. 378 Recent developments, such as the exploitation of
Lashkar-e Tayyiba and false charitable fronts used after the 2005
earthquake in South Asia, display such abuse of charitable
services. 379 Hamas associated charities were used for support in
the Palestinian territories, while Hezbollah had control of the
charitable distribution in Lebanon. 38 0 These examples demonstrate
the continued ability of terrorist entities to effectively exploit and
obtain funds from charitable organizations and relief efforts.
The Treasury Department, in combination with other
departments of the U.S. government, continues to combat terrorist
abuse of the charitable sector by:
(1) sanctioning terrorist related charities and
officials through terrorist financing designations;
(2) contributing financial information and
investigative resources and expertise to advance
criminal investigations and prosecutions of
charities and charitable officials providing material
support for designated terrorist organization or
activities; (3) facilitating international action to
address these abuses; and (4) conducting
comprehensive outreach to the charitable sector to
raise awareness of terrorist exploitation and the
steps that charities can take to protect themselves
from such abuse.381
In addition to these ongoing efforts by the U.S. government,
other nations around the world have recognized the problem of
terrorist exploitation of benevolence and assisted to curb this
abuse.382 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the largest
inter-governmental organization responsible for developing and
promoting global policies to combat money laundering and
378

Id.

379

Id.
Id.

380
381
382

Id.
Id.
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terrorist financing, has published various guidelines for
strengthening the international standard for combating abuse of
non-profit and charitable organizations.383
Regional bodies,
stemming from the FATF, including the Asia Pacific Group,
Eurasian Group, and the Middle East and North African Financial
Action Task Force, have all developed typologies on the active
threat of terrorist financing and support through charities that
operate within their regions."'
These organizations are
implementing measures, leading to 385the ultimate goal of
dismantling charities that fund terrorism.
X. Halting the Terrorist Exploitation of Charities Abroad:
U.N. Assistance
The United States' efforts to curb the financing of terror will
be futile if other nations allow charitable networks, especially
those charities that exploit Zakat and other benevolent purposes, to
escape investigation and regulation. The United Nations has
recognized this problem.386 Several resolutions have been passed
compelling member states to act to freeze terrorist financing.38 7
On September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council
adopted Resolution 1373 forcing its member states to prevent and
suppress the financing of terrorist attacks. 388 Resolution 1373
forces nations to "[p]rohibit nationals or any persons and entities
within their territories from making any funds, financial assets, or
economic resources... for the benefit of persons who commit or
attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of
terrorist attacks.... '389 The resolution necessitates freezing of
assets and economic resources of those individuals who facilitate
the commission of terrorist acts.39° Uncertainty remains as to the
binding legal effect of the resolution, which includes four
383 Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, supra note 368, at 14.
384 Id. at 15.
385 Id.
386 See United Nations Model Terrorist Financing

Bill (2003), available at

http://www.imolin.org/imolin/model.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).
387 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Conventions on Terrorism, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp, (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).
388 S.C. Res. 1373, I(a)-(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
389 Id. 4.
390 Id.
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requirements in order for states to be legally conforming.39 1

In 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1535, which
called for the creation of a Counter Terrorism Committee
Executive Directorate (CTED) to monitor the implementation of
Resolution 1373 and to facilitate its implementation in member
states.392 Resolution 1540 was also added in 2004.39 Backed by

the 1540 committee, its task was to monitor member states'
compliance with previous resolutions, calling on states to prevent
non-state actors (including terrorist groups) from accessing
weapons of mass destruction.394

On September 14, 2005, in

conjunction with the World Summit, the Security Council held a
high-level meeting during which Resolution 1624 was adopted.
Resolution 1624 condemned all acts of terrorism, irrespective of
their motivation, as well as the incitement of these acts.395
Secretary General Kofi Annan launched a new proposal during
this September 2005 summit. Using a five-pillar approach, Annan
sought to: "dissuade groups from resorting to terrorism; deny
terrorist the means to carry out an attack; deter states from
supporting terrorist groups; develop state capacity to prevent
terrorism; and defend human rights in the context of terrorism and

391 Id. (The four requirements of Resolution 1373 are to: [1] prevent and suppress
the financing of terrorist attacks; [2] criminalize the willful provision or collection, by
any means directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the
intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used in
order to carry out terrorist acts; [3] freeze without delay funds and other financial assets
or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts; of
entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and
entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including
funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
such persons and associated persons and entities; and [4] prohibit their nationals or any
persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or
economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly,
for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit of facilitate or participate in
the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by
such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such
persons.).
392 See UN Action to Counter Terrorism, Adopting a global counter-terrorism
strategy, available at http://www.un.org/terrorism/framework.shtml (last visited Sept. 1,
2008) [hereinafter UN Action to Counter Terrorism].
393 See G.A. Res. 60/388, U.N. Doc. A!RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006).
394 Id.
395 Id.
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counter-terrorism. 3 96 On May 2, 2006, Annan released his report
titled Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations Used for a
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.39 7 These recommendations
further developed and refined the pillars previously stated. The
report also identified practical means for the United Nations to
strengthen individual and collective capacity to fight terrorism.3 98
On September 8, 2006 Annan's global counter terrorism strategy
was adopted by the General Assembly.399
As of January 2006, thirty-four United Nation member states
had combined to freeze over $93 million in terrorist assets under
the al-Qaeda and Taliban regime. °° The United Nations Security
Council has also imposed various travel bans and financial
In
sanctions against al-Qaeda and associated entities.4"'
conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, forty nations
have been assessed on anti-money-laundering and terrorism
financing capacity.40 2 The World Bank has also assessed measures
of compliance with counter terrorism financing standards and
delivered technical assistance to all developing regions.40 3
Understanding that the ultimate success in the fight against
those who commit terrorist acts requires global support, the United
States must be the leader in both pushing for U.N. policies
surrounding sanctioning, and setting an example by implementing
and abiding by these policies. The task at hand is too enormous
for the United States to accomplish by itself. It will take the
cooperation of each individual state and the cooperation of nations
in tune with their neighbors to correctly execute each U.N.
resolution. As a result, trials and tribulations are sure to arise
when a nation must balance between threats of social upheaval,
anti-U.S. sentiment, and conforming to U.N. resolutions.

396 Id.

397 See G.A. Res. 60/388, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006).
398 UN Action to Counter Terrorism, supra note 392.
399 See Uniting Against Terrorism, Recommendations Used for a Global CounterTerrorism Strategy, Apr. 27, 2006, available at http://www.un.org/unitingagainst
terrorism/sg-terrorism-2mayO6.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2008), at 1.
400 Id.
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XI. Conclusion
To succeed in the War on Terror, the U.S. government must
not turn its cheek to what Jihadist and Muslim fundamentalists are
fighting for: that is, their religious ideological roots. The U.S.
government must accept the fact that for the first time since the
Crusades, Western civilization finds itself immersed within a
religious war. 4 The fight against these elusive individuals must
include a religious-ideological dimension. Bombs, sanctions, and
the freezing of assets will not curtail these roots. However, the
goals reached by stunting the financial backing of terrorist
networks are effective in the short term. Though our nation has
been involved in war for the last eight years, no terrorist attacks
have touched our soil during this period. Throughout this
comment, the reader was faced with the dilemma of deciding
whether brawny measures taken by the U.S. government after 9/11
have protected this nation from further attacks, or whether these
allegedly over-intrusive actions were taken in vain. In conjunction
with this query comes another, that is, whether these stringent
national security measures should come at the expense of
displacing and eradicating fundamental due process rights. Judge
Richard Posner explains this current tension between antiterrorism measures and personal and civil rights."' Labeled as
"reality probabilism," Posner claims that people have a difficulty
understanding the tradeoffs between false positives and false
40 6
negatives, because it is difficult to think in probabilistic terms.

"The more rights that criminal defendants enjoy, the more guilty
people who are exonerated; the fewer rights that criminal
47
defendants enjoy, the more innocent people are convicted.
Weighing probabilities against consequences, suicidal terrorism
and those who assist in its implementation can lead to colossal
damage. Does the assumption of equal and opposite probabilities
deem that defendants within terrorist cases should have fewer
rights than normal criminal cases? One could believe so.

404 See Samuel Bar, The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism, What the Fatwas
Say, POL'Y REv., (2004).
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As previously acknowledged, OFAC is able to designate
entities as SDGTs under the auspices of a relaxed requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.4"' Giving terrorists the public
foray of a trial on the merits could potentially incur grave
consequences to U.S. security.40 9 Furthermore, the long, drawnout litigation process may allow for quick movement of "blood
money." The public trial may also give defendants a platform for
propaganda and recruitment. 410 Lastly, a trial on the merits may

clue terrorists in on methods that the U.S. government may use to
investigate terrorist activity.4 1' The threat of revealing such
classified information is enormous. However, public sentiment
suggests, and our Constitution insists, that before the freezing and
the practical taking of property from these charitable
organizations, due process is given in the form of adequate
notification of the charges and the opportunity to be heard at these
proceedings.4 2 In a nation founded upon individual rights, the
U.S. government must struggle with its own citizens designating it
the "bad guy" for implementing legislation to fight against those
that have attacked this nation and threaten to do so in the future.
With no end in sight for the War on Terror, we must become
accustomed to the battle between protection and privacy-a battle
that is taking place among the citizenry of the United States in the
legal combat zone.
SUMEET H. CHUGANI
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